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IN THE COURT OP APPEALS
OP THE STATE OF UTAH

DAVID BLAINE,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 92-0734-CA

PAMELA BRADSHAW (BLAINE) ,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

DEFENDANT/APPELLANT, Pamela Bradshaw ("Ms. Bradshaw"),
by and through counsel, Brian M. Barnard of the Utah Legal
Clinic, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
submits the following REPLY BRIEF in support of her appeal:

INTRODUCTION
Several factors prompted Ms. Bradshaw to seek modification of the parties' 1986 divorce decree in April, 1991.
The original decree did not provide for the escalation of
support for the parties' child Allison once Appellee's ("Mr,
Blaine's") income substantially exceeded one thousand two
hundred and fifty dollars ($1,250.00+) per month.

Amended

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, f 5, Exhibit "B"

attached to Appellants Brief ("Amended Findings").

How-

ever, in April, 1991, Mr. Blaine was earning two thousand
eight hundred fifty-two dollars ($2,852.00) per month, more
than twice the maximum monthly income anticipated in the
original decree.1

Amended Findings, 5 9; Complaint, 5 2,

Exhibit "A" attached to Appellants Brief ("Complaint").
Also in April, 1991, Allison was eight years old and the
cost of caring for her had increased as she matured.
Amended Findings, 5 4; Complaint, 5 2.

The effects of

inflation had also made caring for Allison more expensive.
Amended Findings, 1 4 ; Complaint, 5 2.
On the basis of these factors and in order to further
Allison's best interests, Ms. Bradshaw petitioned the trial
court to modify the parties7 1986 divorce decree.

Although

the trial court granted certain portions of Ms. Bradshaw's
petition, the court refused to modify the original decree in
the following important ways:

(1) the trial court declined

to order Mr. Blaine to increase his contribution to
Allison's care retroactive to April, 1991, the date he was
served with the Petition for Modification ("petition"); and,
(2) the trial court failed to modify the existing decree to
allow Ms. Bradshaw, as the custodial parent, to again claim
Allison as her dependent for the purposes of income taxes.
Because these rulings were based on legal error, and were

1

As of October 15, 1991, Mr. Blaine's monthly salary
was three thousand eighty-one dollars ($3,081.00) per month.
2

made without sufficient factual findings or legal reasoning,
Ms. Bradshaw now appeals the trial court's decision.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. Issues
Mr. Blaine's statement of the issues in this case is
misleading.

For example, Mr. Blaine characterizes one of

the issues before this court as whether the trial court
erred when it refused to order that Mr. Blaine's increased
child support obligation be retroactive to before October,
1991, even though, allegedly before that date "there was no
substantial change in circumstances as defined by the
Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act." Appellee's Brief
at 1.

However, Mr. Blaine never cites or quotes a statutory

definition of "substantial change" and relies on his
mistaken reading of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6) 1953 as
amended), to suggest a vague definition of "substantial
change."

Mr. Blaine ignores two crucial problems with his

assertion.

First, § 78-45-7.2 (6) applies only to the

impact that the enactment of or change in the guidelines may
have on child support obligations.

Because the provision is

strictly limited in scope, it cannot provide a workable
definition of "substantial change" for the broad purposes of
the Act.

Second, § 78-45-7.2 (6) provides that a 25% or

more increase from an existing child support order and a new
obligation under Utah's child support guidelines is a
3

sufficient —

not a necessary —

the obligation.

basis for a modification of

Because § 78-45-7.2 (6) provides only one

possible definition of a "substantial change" for the
purpose of the Act, that "definition" is of little value to
a general understanding of the term.
Mr. Blaine also misrepresents the second issue before
this Court.

He characterizes this issue as whether the

trial court erred when it refused to transfer the tax
dependency exemption to Ms. Bradshaw even though "based on
the stipulated facts, there was no change in the circumstances upon which the Decree of Divorce was based."
Appellee's Brief at 1.

Contrary to Mr. Blaine's contention,

the stipulated facts in this case confirm that substantial
changes in the parties' circumstances did occur after the
1986 decree.

These new circumstances —

an increase in Mr.

Blaine's 1991 income to 2.5 times above the maximum income
anticipated by the original decree, (Findings of Fact, \

2),

and the increase in the cost of caring for Allison, (Findings of Fact, 5 4) —

required that the tax exemption be

transferred to Ms. Bradshaw.

Although these are the changed

circumstances which prompted the trial court to increase Mr.
Blaine's support obligation to Allison, they also establish
the proper basis for a transfer of the award of the tax dependency exemption.

4

II.

Standard of Review
Because the trial court's ruling was based on stip-

ulated facts, there are no disputed facts in this case.
Accordingly, this Court should review the decision below for
correctness and should afford no deference to the trial
court's conclusions.

Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814

(Utah App. 1992); Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah
App. 1990).
Despite the soundness of this authority, Mr. Blaine
contends that the proper standard of review in this case is
"whether the lower court abused its discretion or committed
manifest injustice."

Appellee's Brief at 1.

While this

standard of review may be appropriate when the trial court
has broad discretion to make factual findings and apply them
within the "confines of legal precedence," Crockett v.
Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 819 (Utah App. 1992); see

also,

Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1988); Hansen v.
Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App. 1987), it is not
appropriate when the legal conclusions made by the lower
court are at issue.

Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d at 945

("we review the proffered facts and draw our own legal
conclusions therefrom").

Because an appeals court is in as

good as position to review stipulated facts as is the court
below, this Court should not defer to trial court's
conclusions.

Id.; Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d at 816;

Smith v. Smith, 793 P.2d at 409.
5

In addition, Ms. Bradshaw challenges the adequacy and
appropriateness of the findings by the trial court.

When

the suitability and sufficiency of the findings below is at
issue, this court has determined that the failure to make
proper findings can be itself an abuse of discretion.

Hill

v. Hill. 841 P.2d 722 (Utah App. 1992); Motes v. Motes, 786
P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989); Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d
909, 911-12 (Utah App. 1988).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court made several errors when it declined
to modify portions of the original divorce decree as
requested by Ms. Bradshaw.

First, the trial court relied on

an improper interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6)
(1953 as amended) (hereafter "§ 78-45-7.2 (6)"), when it
refused to order that Mr. Blaine's increased child support
obligation be retroactive to the date of service of the
petition.

Although § 78-45-7.2 (6) applies only to

modification orders based on the enactment of or changes in
the Child Support Guidelines (the "guidelines"), the trial
court applied it to Ms. Bradshaw's petition which recites
Mr. Blaine's increased income and the rising cost of
Allison's care as the grounds for modification.
Second, the trial court improperly denied Ms.
Bradshaw's request that she, as the custodial parent, be
allowed to again claim Allison as her dependent for income
6

tax purposes.

Despite the presumption embodied in the Child

Support Guidelines, Federal tax code, and Utah case law that
the custodial parent should be awarded the dependency
exemption, the trial court refused to transfer the exemption
to Ms. Bradshaw.

In addition, the trial court offered no

findings to substantiate its conclusion to deviate from the
guidelines or established precedent.

This failure alone

constitutes reversible error.
Although Mr. Blaine offers several arguments to justify
the trial court's rulings, his contentions are fruitless.
Mr. Blaine attempts to defend the trial court's decision to
limit the retroactivity of his increased support obligation
to Allison.

Without the benefit of statutory authority or

judicial precedent, Mr. Blaine insists that § 78-45-7.2 (6)
creates a rebuttable presumption that a 25% increase in
child support from the existing order to the amount
established under the guidelines is mandatory to establish a
substantial change in circumstances.
However, Mr. Blaine fails to note that § 78-45-7.2 (6)
is limited in application and deals only child support
orders affected by the "enactment of the guidelines and any
subsequent change in the guidelines . . . "
78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 as amended).

Utah Code Ann. §

Because Ms. Bradshaw's

petition does not rely on the enactment of or a change in
the guidelines to establish a substantial change in circumstances, the provision is not relevant to her petition for
7

modification.

Even if § 78-45-7.2 (6) were relevant it

would not support Mr. Blaine's contention —

the provision

merely establishes a sufficient condition for substantial
change of circumstances, not a necessary or presumptively
rebuttable one.
Mr. Blaine also tries to defend the trial court's
refusal to transfer the tax dependency exemption to Ms.
Bradshaw as the custodian of Allison.

Mr. Blaine insists

that the stipulated facts indicate that there has not been a
substantial change in circumstances which warrants
reconsideration of the award of the tax dependency exemption
provided in the original decree.

However, Mr. Blaine

ignores that two significant factors —

the substantial

increase in his salary and the increase in the cost of
caring for Allison —
exemption.

are relevant to the award of the

Mr. Blaine also forgets that Utah's Child

Support Guidelines, the Federal tax code, 26 U.S.C. § 152(e)
(1988), and judicial precedent all assume that the custodial
parent should be awarded the tax dependency exemption.

In

light of this authority, the trial court is obligated to
abide by the guidelines, or in the alternative, to provide
sufficient and adequate findings to explain its departure
from the statutorily mandated factors and Utah case law.

8

ARGUMENT
I. The Court Order Increasing Mr. Blaine's Support
Obligation to Allison Should be Made Retroactive to April,
1991, the Date of Service of the Petition to Modify.
Although the trial court based its ruling concerning
the retroactive effect of the increase Mr. Blaine's child
support obligation on a misreading of § 78-45-7.2 (6), Mr.
Blaine vainly attempts to defend the court's reasoning.

To

this end, Mr. Blaine insists that § 78-45-7.2 (6) creates a
rebuttable presumption that a 25% difference between an
existing child support order and a support obligation under
the guidelines is necessary to establish a substantial
change in circumstances for the purposes of modifying a
support order.
19.

For example,

Appellee's Brief at 10, 18 and

For several reasons, this interpretation of § 78-45-7.2

(6) is incorrect.
Most importantly, § 78-45-7.2 (6) applies only to the
impact of the "enactment of the guidelines and any
subsequent change in the guidelines11 on child support
obligations.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 as

amended) (emphasis added).2

This limitation on the scope of

2

The relevant portion of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2
(6) (1953 as amended), states:
With regard to child support orders, enactment of
the guidelines and any subsequent change in the
guidelines constitutes a substantial or material
change of circumstances as a ground for modification of a court order, if there is a difference
of at least 25% between the existing order and the
guidelines . . . .
9

§ 78-45-7.2 (6) makes the provision irrelevant to Ms.
Bradshaw's petition for modification.

Mr. Blaine fails to

acknowledge that Ms. Bradshaw's petition is not based on the
enactment of or a change in the guidelines.

Instead, Ms.

Bradshaw claims that a substantial change in circumstances - independent of the impact of the guidelines —

requires

the modification of the parties' original decree. Ms.
Bradshaw justifies her petition with two important
stipulated facts —

(1) that in April, 1991, Mr. Blaine's

income was more than twice the maximum anticipated by the
divorce decree; and (2) that, since the decree, the cost of
caring for Allison had increased significantly.

These

stipulated facts are not dependent on or related to the
impact of the guidelines on Mr. Blaine's support obligation
to Allison.

Thus, § 78-45-7.2 (6) is not relevant to a

determination of retroactivity or a finding of substantial
change in circumstances in this case.
Furthermore, § 78-45-7.2 (6) in particular, and the
guidelines in general, are not very helpful in resolving the
issue of retroactivity.

Rather, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6

(2) (1953 as amended),3 clearly gives the trial court

3

Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-10.6 (2) (1953 as
amended) reads:
A child or spousal support payment under a child
support order may be modified with respect to any
period during which a petition for modification is
pending, but only from the date notice of that
petition was given to the . . . obligor . . . .
10

discretion to determine the proper date of retroactivity.
Crockett v. Crockett. 836 P.2d at 820 ("[§ 30-3-10.6 (2)]
grants to the trial court full discretion to decide when an
increased award should be made effective").4

Because the

Child Support Guidelines are not intended to limit or
otherwise direct the discretion of the trial court as to the
retroactive effect of support obligations, any presumptions
created by the guidelines are also irrelevant to retroactivity.
In any case, § 78-45-7.2 (6) does not create a
rebuttable presumption concerning the definition of substantial change in circumstances.

Although Mr. Blaine

asserts that a presumption is created, he fails to cite any
authority to support this contention.

Instead, he relies on

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (2) (a) (1953 as amended) ("the
Child Support Guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable
presumption in establishing or modifying the amount of . . .
child support)," to sustain his claim.

However, § 78-45-7.2

(2) (a) is not relevant to § 78-45-7.2 (6) or to the issue
of retroactivity and any rebuttable presumption created by
the provision is inapplicable to the trial court's ruling in
this case.
4

Although the trial court herein has broad discretion
to decide the retroactive effect of Mr. Blaine's increased
child support obligation, it cannot base its decision on an
improper reading of the law or make its decision without
providing the parties with adequate explanation or support.
Because the district court committed both these errors, its
ruling is invalid.
11

As confirmed above, § 78-45-7,2 (6) is not part of the
guidelines.

Instead, § 78-45-7.2 (6) is a part of the

procedure to implement the guidelines and is meant only to
determine when the enactment of or changes in the guidelines
alone create a substantial change in circumstances
sufficient to require modification of a support obligation.
Accordingly, § 78-45-7.2 (2) (a) does not encompass § 78-457.2 (6) as part of the guidelines and makes no presumption
concerning the 25% increase provision.5
Mr. Blaine overlooks another crucicil detail of § 78-457.2 (6). He fails to recognize that § 78-45-7.2 (6)
specifies that a 25% increase in support obligation is a
sufficient, rather than a necessary condition for the
finding of a substantial change in circumstances.

Thus, the

only possible rebuttable presumption created by §§ 78-45-7.2
(2) (a) & (6) would be that a 25% difference between an
existing support order and an obligation established by the
guidelines serves "as a ground" —

not the only ground

for a modification of the existing order.

—

Utah Code Ann. §

78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 as amended) (emphasis added).

Because

Ms. Bradshaw is relying on other grounds, independent of §
78-45-7.2 (6), to justify her petition for modification,
this presumption would not apply to or affect her claim.

5

Appropriately, in her petition asking for retroactivity to April, 1991, Ms. Bradshaw need not and does not
seek a variance from the guidelines.
12

Finally, Mr. Blaine disputes Ms. Bradshaw,s contention
that the trial court erred by failing to provide adequate
findings to support its conclusion that his increased
support obligation to Allison was retroactive to only
October, 1991. He challenges Ms. Bradshaw's claim even
though the trial court relied solely upon an incorrect
reading of § 78-45-7.2 (6) and offered no further findings
to support its conclusion.

However, Mr. Blaine fails to

note that the trial court did not fulfill its obligation to
sufficiently explain and support its rulings.

Without

findings by the trial court, the parties are in no position
to assess or challenge the court,s decision.

Crockett v.

Crockett, 836 P.2d at 820-821; Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d
836, 838 (Utah App. 1991).

In addition, without factual

findings and documented reasoning by the trial court, an
appellate court is unable to review the proceedings below.
Id.; see also,

Allred v Allred, 835 P.2d 974 (Utah App.

1992) (trial court must specify in its findings the reasons
a tax exemption is not given to the custodial parent);
Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah App. 1990) (trial
court must enter findings of fact on factors which
constitute material issues); Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232
(Utah App. 1989); Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909 (Utah
App. 1988).

Given the requirements established in these

cases, the trial court failed to make sufficient and
adequate findings to support its decision.
13

The trial court

relied on an incorrect interpretation of law and failed to
address or consider other factors relevant to the
retroactive effect of Mr. Blaine/s child support obligation.
This failure constitutes an abuse of discretion and requires
that this court vacate the ruling below.

However, because

the conclusions below were based on stipulated facts, this
Court can properly determine that Mr. Blaine's increased
support obligation to Allison should be retroactive to
April, 1991 on the basis of the undisputed facts before it.
The fact$ of this case require that the modification of
the original child support order should be retroactive to
April, 1991.

The two factors, stipulated to by the parties

as creating a substantial change in circumstances and as
requiring a modification of the original decree, were both
in existence in April, 1991.

By April, 1991, Mr. Blaine's

income was more than double the maximum anticipated by the
original decree and the cost of caring for Allison had
significantly increased.

Accordingly, a substantial change

in circumstances, sufficient to require a modification of
the parties' existing child support obligations, had
occurred by April, 1991. As a result, the increase in Mr.

14

Blaine's support obligation6 to Allison should be retroactive to that date.7
II. As the Custodial Parent, Ms. Bradshaw Should Be Awarded
the Tax Dependency Exemption for Allison.
Mr. Blaine vainly defends the trial court's refusal to
transfer the tax dependency exemption for Allison to her
custodial parent.
unsuccessful.

Again, Mr. Blaine's arguments are

The trial court's ruling is inconsistent with

the Child Support Guidelines,8 with the Federal tax code, 26
6

The exact increase should be based upon the parties'
stipulated incomes as of April 22, 1991.
7

After acknowledging the stipulation and finding
"that the cost of caring for [Allison as] a nine year old
child is substantially greater than for caring for [her as]
a three year old child," Amended Findings, 5 4, Mr. Blaine
criticizes Ms. Bradshaw for not introducing more evidence to
support the fact that it is now more expensive to care for
Allison. Appellee's Brief at 21. This criticism is misplaced. Initially, Mr. Blaine forgets that the parties
stipulated to the fact that care for Allison has become
substantially more costly. Because of this stipulation, Ms.
Bradshaw does not need to introduce evidence concerning the
increased cost of caring for Allison.
Second, Mr. Blaine forgets that one of the major goals
of the child support guidelines was to eliminate the need
for the introduction of receipts, itemizations and other
proofs of expenses to support a child support obligation.
The guidelines are presumed to be correct and to account for
costs associated with rearing a child. Requiring Ms.
Bradshaw to prove by further evidence that caring for
Allison is more costly than it was in 1986, especially after
the pertinent stipulation, would defeat the purpose of the
Child Support Guidelines.
8

According to the Utah Child Support Task Force,
Report On Proposed Child Support Guidelines, the guidelines
presume that custodial parents claim their children as
dependents for the purposes of income tax exemptions: "The
basic child support figures are further adjusted reflecting
the assumption that the custodial parent would receive the
exemptions for all children. If the custodial parent
15

U.S.C. § 152(e) (1988), and judicial precedent, Motes v.
Motes, 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989); Allred v Allred. 835
P.2d 974 (Utah App. 1992), each of which direct that the
custodial parent should be awarded the exemption.

Despite

these mandates, the trial court determined that a transfer
of the exemption was not warranted.

Further, although it

departed significantly from the guidelines and from judicial
precedent, the trial court did not justifying its decision.
Mr. Blaine's contentions cannot hide the fact that the trial
court's failure to explain or support its ruling is
erroneous.
Importantly, Mr. Blaine ignores that his new support
obligation to Allison was based on the statutory Child
Support Guidelines.

These guidelines presume that the

custodial parent is entitled to claim and does claim any
children as dependents for the purposes of tax exemption.9
relinquishes the exemption, this could be grounds for an
adjustment in the basic award." Report On Proposed
Child
Support Guidelines
at 6, 1 I, E (May 1988).
9

With an air of disbelief, Mr. Blaine states that
"[t]he Appellant seems to be suggesting that the court's
decision whether or not to modify the tax dependency
exemption must be done in accordance with the Child Support
Guidelines." Appellee's Brief at 24. Ms. Bradshaw is not
just suggesting that compliance with the guidelines is
necessary, she believes and understands that to be the law!
The child support award herein was based upon the
guidelines which assume the custodial parent claims the
child as a dependent for income tax purposes. If the
custodial parent were not assumed to be claiming the child
as a dependant, the guidelines would require more support
from the non-custodial parent to the custodial parent.
See,
Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d at 978 (the transfer of the tax
dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent llx should be
16

In order to depart from the rebuttable presumptions created
by the guidelines, (Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (2) (a) and
(b) (1953 as amended)), the trial court must find that
compliance with the guidelines would be "unjust, inappropriate or not in the best interest of a child in a particular case . . . "
amended).

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 (3) (1953 as

Because the trial court made no findings at all

to support its conclusion, it failed to comply with the
statute and abused its discretion.

Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d

at 724.
Mr. Blaine also failed to justify the trial court's
departure from established case law concerning the award of
the tax dependency exemption for Allison.

Precedent in Utah

sets forth factors to be considered by the trial court
before it should order custodial parents to waive their tax
exemptions:
First, the noncustodial parent must have a higher
income and provide the majority of support for the
child. Second, the trial court must, from its
findings, determine that by transferring the
dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent .
. . [it is acting] in the best interests of the
limited to those situations where the non-custodial parent
has the higher income and provides the majority of support
for the child or children whose exemption is claimed —
support at a level which can be increased as a result of a
reduction in his or her tax burden'") (quoting Motes v.
Motes, 786 P.2d at 239, emphasis added).
Therefore, it is only fair, if not mandated by statute,
that the custodial parent, the obligee, be allowed to claim
the dependency exemption. Yes, the award of "the tax
dependency exemption must be done in accordance with the
Child Support Guidelines."
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child, which in all but exceptional circumstances
would translate into an increased support level
for the child.
Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d at 978, Rather complying with
Allred, the trial court failed to make any findings
concerning Allison's best interests.

Specifically, the

trial court did not explain why Allison's best interests did
not require an increased support obligation from Mr. Blaine
to offset the detriment to Ms. Bradshaw from not having the
tax exemption.

Despite these failures, Mr. Blaine continues

to insist that the trial court properly refused to transfer
the dependency exemption.
In addition, the trial court neglected to explain why
the same substantial changes in circumstance that warranted
an increase in Mr. Blaine's child support did not warrant a
transfer of the tax dependency exemption to the custodial
parent.

While the trial court did determine that a "sub-

stantial change in circumstances of the parties . . .
justifies modification of the [Mr. Blaine's] child support
obligation," (Conclusions of Law, 5 3), it went on, without
explanation, to find that

,f

[t]here has not been a sub-

stantial change in circumstances of the parties sufficient
to warrant altering the portion of the existing decree which
awards to [Mr. Blaine] the right to clciim the minor child of
the parties as a dependent" for tax purposes.

Id., f 8.

Although both the guidelines and Utah case law mandate
that the same circumstances which would justify a
18

modification of Mr. Blaine's child support obligation would
justify a transfer of the dependency exemption, Mr. Blaine
argues that such a position is not defendable.

To make this

assertion, Mr. Blaine ignores that the circumstances upon
which an award of child support are based are the exact same
circumstances upon which the allocation of the dependency
exemption are based.

As established in Allred, the factors

relevant to allocation of the dependency exemption include
reference to "the particular economic realities" of the
parties.

Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d at 978 (quoting,

Motes

v. Motes. 786 P.2d at 239). The court must consider the
incomes of the parties and the best interests of the child
before it orders the transfer of the dependency exemption to
the noncustodial parent.

Allred v. Allred. 835 P.2d at 978.

Similarly, the guidelines incorporate these economic factors
into a statutory determination of a parent's child support
obligation.

The guidelines consider the incomes of the

parties as well as the best interests of the child to
properly set the obligations of the parties.
Mr. Blaine suggests that the only factor relevant to
the award of the tax exemption to him was that he had a
higher income and therefore has "more use" for the exemption.

Appellee's Brief at 24. This myopic character-

ization of the factors underlying the award of the dependency exemption clearly ignores Allison's best interests.
Further, this suggestion is contrary to Allred, which
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considers the best interest of the child and the
contribution of each parent to the care of the child in
addition to the relative incomes of the parents.
Allred, 835 P.2d at 978.

Allred v.

In that case, this Court

specifically rejected the contention that the mere fact that
one party has a greater income is an appropriate basis for
the award of the dependency exemption to that party.

Id.

In addition, if greater income were the only factor upon
which the award was made, the guidelines would not assume
that the custodial parent is entitled to the tax exemption.
Instead the guidelines would assume that the parent with the
greater income would claim the exemption regardless of the
best interests of the child.

Because the guidelines make no

such assumptions, Mr. Blaine/s argument fails.
Finally, Mr. Blaine's argument that the guidelines do
not apply to modifications of a pre-guideline decree also is
unsuccessful.

In 1986, when the parties' original divorce

was granted, the statutory support guidelines were not in
effect.10 However, when Ms. Bradshaw's petition for modification was heard in September, 1992, the guidelines were
applicable to her claim.

Appropriately, the trial court's

modification of Mr. Blaine's support obligation to Allison
was determined under these guidelines.

Contrary to Mr.

Blaine's suggestion, however, the guidelines cannot be
followed piecemeal.
10

As part of the determination of Mr.

The Guidelines went into effect in April, 1989.
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Blaine's support obligation, the guidelines assume that Ms,
Bradshaw is entitled to the tax exemption.

The guidelines

direct that the allocation of the dependency exemption be
based upon the parties' custodial versus noncustodial
status, not upon the relative incomes of the parties, as Mr.
Blaine suggests.11

Because the guidelines are applicable

and were applied to Ms. Bradshaw's petition for
modification, reason dictates that all of the assumptions
they embody must be employed in the revision of the parties'
original decree.
For the reasons provided above, Mr. Blaine has failed
to justify the trial court's decision not to return the tax
dependency exemption for Allison to Ms. Bradshaw. Mr.
Blaine's arguments do not explain away the trial court's
failure to comply with the presumption embodied in Utah's
Child Support Guidelines, the Federal tax code and Utah case
law that the custodial parent is entitled to the exemption.
11

Mr. Blaine concedes that in setting support amounts,
"Utah's Child Support Guidelines assume that the custodial
parent is awarded the tax dependency exemption." Appellee's
Brief at 26. Mr. Blaine then brushes aside this impediment
to his position, and without citation to any authority says,
that assumption only applies in the initial granting of a
divorce and not in cases of modification such as this case.
Id.
Mr. Blaine further ignores that statutory assumption,
by simply repeating his belief that there has been no
substantial change in circumstances relative to the
dependency exemption. For the sake of argument, if we
assume that there has been a sufficient change in circumstances, as Ms. Bradshaw posits, and the guidelines are
being used to set the amount of new child support to be
paid, then it follows that the guidelines must be followed
with regard to the allocation of the dependency exemption.
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In addition, Mr. Blaine cannot justify the trial court/s
failure to depart from the guidelines and judicial precedent
without providing any findings to defend this departure.
Furthermore, because the parties stipulated to the facts
relevant to the award of the dependency exemption and this
Court is in as good a position to consider these facts as
was the trial court, this Court should draw its own legal
conclusions from the facts. Accordingly, the Court should
transfer the tax exemption for Allison to Ms. Bradshaw, the
custodial parent.

CONCLUSION
As determined above, the trial court improperly based
its conclusion concerning the retroactive effect of its
child support order on a mistaken reading of Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45-7.2 (6) (1953 as amended).

As a result, the trial

court neglected to provide necessary factual and legal
findings to support its decision.

The trial court also

improperly refused to return the tax exemption for Allison
to her custodial parent without adequate findings to support
its departure from the statutory guidelines and established
case law.
Furthermore, none of Mr. Blaine's arguments can justify
the trial court's erroneous rulings.
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Specifically, Mr.

Blaine's contention that § 78-45-7.2 (6) creates a
rebuttable presumption relevant to Ms. Bradshaw's petition
for modification is unsuccessful.

Ms. Bradshaw has not

relied, and has no need to rely upon § 78-45-7.2 (6) to
support her claim.

Instead, she cites Mr. Blaine's

increased income and the increased costs of caring for
Allison as grounds for her petition.

In addition, because §

78-45-7.2 (6) is not part of the guidelines, but a procedure
for implementing them, § 78-45-7.2 (6) is not the source of
a presumption created by the guidelines.

Finally, § 78-45-

7.2 (6) sets out only a sufficient condition for a substantial change in circumstances, not a necessary condition.
As a result, the only presumption created by this section is
that a 25% increase, due to the enactment or amendment of
the guidelines, is sufficient cause for a modification of an
existing child support obligation.
Mr. Blaine's argument that the stipulated facts in this
case do not warrant a transfer of the dependency exemption
is also ill-founded.

The same economic realities —

the

changing financial status of the parties and the increased
costs of caring for Allison —

which required a modification

of the original child support order also require transfer of
the tax exemption to the custodial parent.

Both Utah case

law and the Child Support Guidelines consider economic
factors and the best interests of the child in addition to
relative incomes of the parties to award the dependency
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exemption.

In addition, Mr. Blaine's suggestion that the

guidelines are not applicable to an alteration of the award
of the dependency exemption is invalid.

Because the trial

court's modification of Mr. Blaine's child support
obligation was based upon the statutory guidelines, the
allocation of the tax exemption must also conform to the
guideline's assumptions.

Alternatively, if justice demands

a departure from the presumption that the custodial parent
is entitled to the exemption, embodied in the guidelines and
Utah case law, the trial court must provide sufficient
findings to support its deviation from these presumptions.
Because the trial court failed to follow the guidelines and
Utah case law and failed to justify its decision to do so,
the ruling below is erroneous.
Accordingly, this Court should vacate the trial court's
ruling concerning the retroactive effect of Mr. Blaine's
increase child support obligation to Allison and the court's
refusal to transfer the tax dependency exemption to Ms.
Bradshaw.

In light of the substantial change in

circumstances which had occurred by April, 1991, this Court
should conclude that considerations of Allison's best
interests and the financial status of her parents require
that the modification of Mr Blaine's support obligation be
retroactive to the date upon which Mr. Blaine received
notice of Ms. Bradshaw's petition in an amount based upon
their April, 1991 incomes.

This Court should also direct
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the trial court to enter an order requiring that Allison's
best interests will be served by awarding Ms. Bradshaw, as
her custodian, the tax dependency exemption commencing in
1992.
DATED this 28th day of MAY, 1993.
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